The State of India’s Public Sector Defence Business

Setting the Context

India has one of many largest defence industrial bases (DIB) within the growing world, comprising an unlimited community of analysis and improvement (R&D) and manufacturing entities and using a number of thousand scientists, engineers and different employees. The Indian DIB has traditionally been dominated by the general public sector, whose efficiency has been lackluster leaving India depending on exterior sources for essential arms and ammunitions.[a] Such dependence has been a supply of embarrassment for the nation which in moments of disaster has needed to attain out to pleasant overseas nations with an inventory of emergency procurements.[1]

The query is why India has not been in a position to supply, if not all, at the very least a significant a part of its arms necessities, from its indigenous base. What’s the accountability of the general public sector—the pillar of India’s arms {industry} which continues to have a dominant position within the nation’s armament analysis and manufacturing?

This paper first examines India’s motivations for defence manufacturing earlier than evaluating the important thing efficiency parameters of the defence public sector models concerned in each R&D and manufacturing. That is adopted by a dialogue on the federal government initiatives designed to enhance the functioning of the general public sector. A prognosis for the general public sector is offered by the use of mapping the progress of the personal sector in defence manufacturing.

Motivations of Indian Defence Manufacturing

Defence consultants have lengthy debated whether or not a growing nation like India ought to even have interaction in defence manufacturing—not to mention try for autarky in arms manufacture. Some have hinted that “makes an attempt at autarky are more and more a idiot’s pursuit” and “all however essentially the most highly effective states should abandon any hopes of sustaining autonomous arms manufacturing.”[2] Such argument is premised on techno-economic elements and can also be partly influenced by the altering nature of the worldwide arms {industry}; it’s now broadly accepted that trendy weapons comprise extra superior and miniaturised expertise than previously. This may imply that weapons have develop into so costly that solely superior industrialised international locations with massive defence budgets may afford to develop, manufacture and improve them.[b] Having better monetary sources, such international locations can afford greater manufacturing traces, thus acquiring economies of scale—one thing which is prohibitive for international locations with an insufficient industrial base or smaller budgets. That India’s arms manufacturing has been pricey compared to import choices, provides credence to this line of argument. The Stockholm Worldwide Peace Analysis Institute (SIPRI) as soon as noticed that India’s manufacturing value of plane just like the HJT-16 fundamental coach, MiG-21, HF-24 and Gnat fighters, Alouette helicopter and HS-748 transports have been 150 to 190 % of the price of related plane that Indian may have imported.[3]

If the rising value of the trendy weapons is an inhibiting issue, the forces of globalisation within the post-Chilly Conflict period haven’t helped, both. To tide over the rising value of  trendy arms, the worldwide defence {industry} has undergone “vital modifications,” entailing “an growing stage of cooperation between protection corporations, involving coproduction/ improvement, partnerships, mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures.”[4] India too, has tried, with restricted success, to open its arms {industry} to overseas corporations whereas encouraging home enterprises to hunt partnerships with international unique tools producers (OEMs), together with  by means of the offset pointers of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) arms procurement guide.[c]

Whereas the forces of globalisation have offered sure alternatives for rising defence manufactures to be a part of the worldwide provide chain, these producers, as some argue, would nonetheless be “higher off if [their] defence-industry coverage follows a restricted objective that’s centered on the area of interest markets.”[5] The forces of globalisation, the argument goes, are towards a rustic like India to develop an unbiased and broad-based DIB. But such limitations haven’t deterred India from establishing a big DIB. It has repeatedly strived for better self-sufficiency, regardless that, barring just a few achievements with strategic methods pertaining to nuclear weapons and missiles, and to some extent naval shipbuilding—the general efficiency of the home arms {industry} has remained largely unsatisfactory.

Nonetheless, India is now on a far stronger footing to undertake indigenous arms manufacturing. Because the fourth largest navy spender on this planet, forward of a number of superior defence manufacturing international locations (the UK, France and Germany, amongst others),[6] boasting an ever-growing defence price range, India has the monetary muscle to maintain a comparatively autonomous defence industrial base. The way it leverages its buying energy to develop a reputable arms {industry} is a distinct matter altogether.

A query that emerges is why India has gone on a defence industrialisation path. There are three broad motivations for international locations resorting to home arms manufacturing. First is the safety of provide that ensures regular movement of arms and spare components to be used in instances of want. With the opportunity of a collusive, two-front struggle with Pakistan and China being very a lot a part of India’s defence planning, indigenous manufacturing of arms is the surest approach of defending the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

India has typically regarded to enhance its safety of provide by diversifying its provider base. That possibility, nevertheless, has had its personal pitfalls. Previously, India had been a sufferer of arms embargoes, particularly these imposed by the US which out of the blue determined to cease arms provide after the 1965 struggle and 1998 nuclear check. Though India-US relations have vastly improved lately, the worry of US sanctions has not waned utterly. Below the Countering American Adversaries By means of Sanctions Act (CAATSA), India, like another recipients of Russian arms, is on the mercy of US overseas coverage machinations.[7] India’s overwhelming dependency on Russia can also be partly why New Delhi, regardless of criticism from its Western companions, adopted a “studied public neutrality” in the direction of Russian navy aggression towards Ukraine.[8]

In the course of the Kargil struggle of 1999, when India sought exterior arms and different help to repel the Pakistani intruders from mountainous heights, it needed to swallow the bitter capsule of its exterior dependence. Almost 20 years after the conclusion of that struggle, Basic VP Malik, head of the Indian military on the time, reveals that “[I]n each pressing buy in the course of the Kargil struggle, irrespective of from which nation, they exploited us as a lot as they might.”[9] He famous that in response to India’s request for few weapons and ammunition “one nation equipped refurbished outdated weapons”, whereas “one other nation” equipped “1970 classic ammunition.”[10] The peak of exploitation, Malik informs, was reserved for satellite tv for pc imagery which India purchased on the value INR 36,000 per picture. As New Delhi discovered in a while, the photographs have been three years outdated and barely helpful. The continued struggle in Ukraine has additionally uncovered India’s vulnerability for its dependence on Russia, with the Indian air power suspending its plan to improve its Su-30MKI fighters due to the prevailing scenario.[11]

Linked to provide safety is the tactical profit that home manufacturing supplies. Underscoring the significance of the home DIB for battlefield surprises, PM Narendra Modi, in an tackle to the home {industry}, famous that “uniqueness and shock parts can solely occur when the tools is developed in your individual nation.”[12]

To make sure, India has typically tried to customize imported arms by means of incorporation of India Particular Enhancements (ISE), thus retaining a technological edge over adversaries. Nevertheless, there’s a distinction between the customisation undertaken by the overseas distributors and that which is carried out by home entities. Getting a very good worth for ISE shouldn’t be a simple activity, as the federal government discovered whereas negotiating a contract to buy Rafale fighters from France.[13]

By comparability, the restricted expertise of customisation by means of the home {industry} appears to be passable.  The combination of BrahMos missile with SU-30 fighter plane, permitting it the potential to strike deep inside enemy’s territory at a stand-off distance of greater than 400 km,[14]  is one instance of how leaning on home {industry} may show helpful. The Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) that license-manufactures SU-30 fighters, efficiently built-in the missile into the plane at a a lot decrease value than demanded by Russia. In accordance with RK Tyagi, who was on the helm of HAL when the choice of integration was taken, the price range his firm was allotted to undertake the mixing was a mere INR 0.8 billion compared to the INR 13 billion (US$200 million) that Russia quoted.[15]

The second motivation that has pushed India’s arms manufacturing is techno-economic in nature. Justifications resembling conserving overseas trade, growing state-of-the-art defence manufacturing bases with backward/ahead linkage with bigger civilian {industry}, and creating employment alternatives have pushed India’s defence industrialisation course of. The overseas trade rationale was significantly vital within the early years of India’s independence, when low overseas trade reserves motivated India to go for license manufacturing of Russian weapons over direct import of Western ones.[16]

With India’s complete trade reserves exceeding US$600 billion (firstly of 2022-23[17]), such shortages will not be a dire downside for Indian decision-makers at the moment. Nonetheless, different financial advantages stay essential. That is significantly true for the Modi authorities, which has put ‘Make in India’ and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ on the centre of its financial coverage to spice up industrial and financial progress whereas propelling India as a world innovation and manufacturing hub. New Delhi has recognized 10 ‘Champion Sectors’ together with defence and aerospace {industry} for ‘renewed focus’ due to their “potential to develop into international champions, drive double digit progress in manufacturing and generate vital employment alternatives.”[18] The Modi authorities additionally claims to have created “innumerable new jobs” within the defence {industry} because the announcement of Make in India.[19]

The third motivation is what Bitzinger refers to as ‘techno-nationalism’.[20] Techno-nationalism, as outlined by some, is a type of “considering that hyperlinks technological innovation and capabilities on to a nation’s nationwide safety, financial prosperity and social stability.”[21] Within the subject of arms manufacturing, the techno-nationalistic impulse drives a rustic to try for self-sufficiency not for the sake of it however to achieve strategic autonomy and bigger geopolitical objectives whereas exerting regional and international affect. Bitzinger notes this techno-nationalist impulse is especially ubiquitous in international locations resembling India, China, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia which have regional or international ambitions. He additional observes that the mannequin doesn’t thoughts the extra value necessitated by home manufacturing, nor does it foreswear overseas expertise dependency; relatively it “paradoxically entails the exploitation of imported expertise in an effort to ultimately notice self-sufficiency.”[22]

The license-based manufacturing mannequin that India has adopted for its armament programmes—fighter jets, tanks, submarines, helicopters, anti-tank missile and a number of different arms—is partly motivated to permit the home {industry} to study from others’ technological development. As an illustration, whereas importing applied sciences for home manufacturing of plane (resembling MiG and Su-30 fighters), India has continued to develop its personal fighters: LCA and now the fifth-generation Superior Medium Fight Plane (AMCA).[d]

India’s dedication to self-reliance has been enshrined in plenty of authorities reviews and coverage bulletins. In 1992, the Self-Reliance Committee, headed by then scientific adviser to the defence minister, Dr APJ Abdul Kalam (who would later be President of India), formulated a roadmap by which India would progressively enhance self-reliance in defence procurement from then 30 % to 70 % by 2005.[23] The Make in India initiative and the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan launched by the current authorities additionally accord a powerful give attention to autarky. Nevertheless, owing to numerous elements defined later, self-reliance stays a distant dream.

Much like techno-nationalist impulses are what Kinsella and Chima have described as ‘symbolic motivations’ behind India’s defence, area, and nuclear programmes. Analysing articles printed over a interval of over 20 years in a well-liked Indian weekly, they discover a sturdy resonance of three distinct symbolic impulses—asserting autonomy in international affairs, gaining worldwide standing and status, and boosting self-image—behind India’s armament/strategic programmes.[24]

Techno-nationalism/symbolic motivation is clear with the successive Indian governments. India’s first PM Jawaharlal Nehru equated self-reliance in armament manufacturing with the nation’s independence.[25] The present regime of PM Modi has gone to the extent of linking self-reliance in defence manufacturing with India’s position as a web safety supplier within the Indian Ocean area and the nation’s strategic/pleasant ties with others.[26] Defence exports have been a key instrument in boosting India’s exterior picture and geopolitical affect. Exports, even within the type of presents, have more and more been used as a instrument by the federal government to strengthen its geopolitical maintain, particularly with neighbours.[e]

Public Sector Defence Business: An Overview

India’s public sector defence {industry} is an element of a bigger arrange of government-owned/managed manufacturing models and analysis labs that the nation has nurtured since independence. The federal government-driven techno-industrial improvement is basically the consequence of the socialistic and centralised planning system that PM Nehru established for socio-economic progress earlier than it was taken to an excessive type by his daughter Indira Gandhi (who was PM of India throughout 1966-77 and 1980-84);[27] elaborate guidelines and laws have been put in place that gave the state unique energy for industrial improvement whereas limiting the position of personal gamers by means of a restrictive industrial licensing coverage, that specified who can produce what, the place and the way a lot.[28]

Within the subject of arms manufacturing, 18 Ordnance Factories (OFs) that India inherited from British India fashioned the core of India’s defence {industry}. This was supported by an plane firm, Hindustan Plane (established in 1940), a rudimentary R&D arrange (which was latter transformed into the Defence Analysis and Growth Organisation (DRDO) in 1958), and an electronics firm (Bharat Electronics Ltd) that was arrange in 1954. The variety of public sector entities within the defence sector has grown since. A lift for public sector growth got here within the type of the 1962 debacle in a short however bloody border struggle with China that uncovered deficiencies in India’s defence preparedness. Within the aftermath of the struggle, plans have been made to broaden the armed forces, increase home arms manufacturing, and enhance R&D.[29] The federal government was keen to spend extra on defence;  the common progress of defence expenditure went from  barely 5 % within the ‘50s to over 16 % within the following decade, with the primary post-war price range rising by 133 %.[30]

The objective of home manufacturing within the aftermath of the 1962 navy debacle was to “materially cut back dependence on exterior sources of provide.”[31] India’s instant focus was increasing the OFs to fulfill the necessities of the military, which confronted the brunt of China’s unprovoked aggression. Between 1962 and the mid-Nineteen Eighties, 11 new OFs have been arrange, in addition to plenty of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs)—BEML (1964) and MIDHANI (1973). DRDO was additionally to expanded in an effort to deepen indigenous R&D.

At current, the general public sector entities functioning straight below administrative management of the MoD encompass 17 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), together with seven new ones created in October 2021 by corporatising the erstwhile 41 departmentally-run OFs.[f] Whereas DPSUs stay the primary gamers in India’s arms manufacturing, there are additionally a number of different PSUs and government-sponsored joint ventures (JVs) engaged in some type of defence manufacturing and high quality monitoring of platforms, methods and armament.[g] Among the many non-MoD-owned PSUs, notable is the Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL) which constructed India’s first indigenous plane provider. Among the many JVs, largest is BrahMos Aerospace Pvt. Ltd (BAPL), arrange by means of an inter-government settlement signed in 1998 between the DRDO and NPOM of Russia. With a complete working revenue of INR 32.50 billion (in 2020-21),[32] the JV has been successful. It has delivered totally different variations of the supersonic missile to all of the three providers and examined its first export success in 2021 when it secured a US$375-million contract from the Philippines.[33]

Among the many older DPSUs, aside from the 4 shipyards—Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd (MDSL), Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL), Backyard Attain Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL)[34]— different entities are devoted for a selected position: navy aviation (HAL), electronics (BEL), particular alloys (MIDHANI), missiles (Bharat Dynamics Ltd, BDL), and earth shifting tools (BEML). The seven new DPSUs (transformed out of the OFs) are additionally equally organised into totally different specialisations—ammunition and explosives; autos; weapons and tools; troop consolation gadgets; military-grade elements and ancillary merchandise; opto-electronics gadgets; and parachutes.

The general public sector, given its measurement, experience and expertise, has a share of almost 80 % in India’s defence manufacturing (see Desk 1). Of the overall manufacturing of the general public sector, the 9 older DPSUs have a share of 55-60 %. Seven out of 9 outdated DPSUs are additionally listed in inventory exchanges with a mixed market-cap of about INR 850 billion (see Desk 2 for choose indicators of the DPSUs).

Desk 1. Share of Public Sector in India’s Defence Gross sales



(INR bn)

OFB (INR bn) Different PSUs /JV (INR bn) Personal Sector (INR bn) Whole (INR bn) Share of the Public Sector (%)
2016-17 404.27 148.25 46.98 141.04 740.54 81
2017-18 434.64 148.29 51.80 153.47 788.20 81
2018-19 453.87 128.16 55.67 173.50 811.20 79
2019-20 476.55 92.27 62.95 158.94 790.71 80
2020-21 467.11 146.35 60.29 172.68 846.43 80
2021-22 557.90 119.13 72.22 199.20 948.45 79
2021-22 631.07 169.98 67.83 199.25 1068.13 81

 Supply: Division of Defence Manufacturing (DDP), MoD, “Dashboard”.[35] 

Desk 2. DPSUs: Choose Indicators, 2020-21

Identify Yr of Institution M-Cap (INR bn)* No. of Staff (2020-21) ^ Income (INR bn)@ Exports (INR mn)US$ R&D Expenditure (INR bn) Order Ebook (INR bn)#
HAL 1963 332.67 26432 227.55 2175.6 14.64 792.29
BEL 1954 304.82 9172 140.64 3728.4 8.87 577.00
BDL 1970 60.96 2812 19.14 781.2 0.53 114.00
BEML 1964 52.28 6053 35.57 282.4 0.71 101.80
MIDHANI 1973 33.10 764 8.13 194.2 0.30 13.50
MDSL 1934 42.88 3683 40.48 0.0 0.85 470.23
GRSE 1934 21.19 1856 11.41 874.9 0.12 246.05
HSL 1952 827 3.93 0.0 0.00 26.73
GSL 1967 1264 8.60 3.3 0.10 143.27
New DPSUs 2021 77199^^ 1402.8US$$ 0.91^^^ 519.39##

Notes. *: Market capitalisation (M-Cap) on Bombay Inventory Change as on March 31, 2021; ^: Excluding informal labour; @: Income from operations (web); US$: Export of products on free on board (FOB) foundation; # As on February 02, 2022; ^^: As of January 2021; $$: Figures for 2019-20; ^^^: As of 2018-19; ##: As on September 30, 2020;

Supply: Compiled by writer from reviews of the Standing Committee on Defence and Ministry of Finance.

Not like the DPSUs, that are captive manufacturing models, DRDO is a devoted defence R&D company below the MoD. The company traces its origin to 1948 when the federal government arrange the Defence Science Organisation (DSO). In 1958, below the instruction of then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, the DSO was merged with the Technical Growth Institutions (TDEs) of the three providers to determine the present-day DRDO. The organisation is headed by a boss who can also be the Secretary in Division of Defence R&D, which was arrange in 1980 to enhance the executive effectivity of the organisation. Just like the DPSUs, the DRDO has additionally grown through the years: from about 10 labs in late Fifties to 52 labs and different institutions at current. Its R&D cuts throughout your entire vary of defence applied sciences: missiles, aeronautics, armaments, fight autos, electronics, life sciences, and strategic supplies.

Though the DRDO has been in existence for greater than 60 years, the company got here into prominence within the Nineteen Eighties when the federal government sanctioned many high-profile defence tasks together with the Built-in Guided Missile Growth Programme (IGMDP) and the Mild Fight Plane (LCA). To assist the high-profile R&D, its price range was additionally elevated, from lower than two % of the defence price range until Nineteen Sixties to greater than 4 % by Nineteen Eighties.

With personnel energy of 21,969, together with 6,966 scientists,[36] the DRDO has a price range of INR 213.30 billion (~ US$2.7 billion), amounting to three.4 % of the MoD’s complete price range of 2022-23.[37] Between 2014-2019, it accomplished 258 tasks price INR 106.43 billion.[38] Until 2021, DRDO developed merchandise that are both inducted into the armed forces or permitted for manufacturing quantities as much as INR 3,033.89 billion (or about US$39 billion).[39] Some notable merchandise which have been inducted or are within the technique of induction embody Agni, Prithvi, Akash, Astra and BrahMos missiles, MBT Arjun, LCA Tejas, Netra AEW&C, HUMSA and ALTAS sonars, and ATAGS gun methods. 

Efficiency of the Public Sector

As the largest participant in India’s defence {industry}, the general public sector has a key position in designing, growing and manufacturing essential arms and different gadgets for defence and safety forces. Inherent in these efforts is a key accountability of constructing India self-reliant.

The general public sector has been on the forefront of supplying main arms and different tools to the armed forces, which few international locations on this planet may develop and manufacture. Because the DRDO typically boasts, India is likely one of the 4 international locations to have Multi Degree Strategic Functionality; one in every of 4 international locations to have Airborne Early Warning & Management System (AEW&CS); one in every of 5 international locations to have our personal Fourth plus era fighter plane; one in every of 5 international locations to have developed and manufactured a Ballistic Missile Defence Programme; one in every of seven international locations to have developed its personal Important Battle Tank; and one in every of choose few international locations to have its personal Digital Warfare and Multi Vary Radar Program.[40] India can also be as one in every of few international locations to have constructed an plane provider and demonstrated an anti-satellite check (ASAT) functionality.

These feats don’t, nevertheless, distract from the obtrusive weak point of the Indian defence {industry}, significantly within the public sector. Regardless of a long time of existence, not a single Indian firm has discovered a spot on this planet’s prime 20 defence corporations,[h] regardless that the nation is now the fourth largest navy spender on this planet. Furthermore, the general public sector is presently unable to fulfill the rising necessities of the Indian armed forces. As Desk 3 exhibits, between 2018-19 and 2020-21, the general public sector’s complete gross sales amounted to 57 % of India’s defence procurement, whereas the general contribution of Indian {industry} is 72 %. Furthermore, if the developments of the previous three years are any indication, the general public sector, just like the defence {industry} as an entire, is shedding its share in India’s complete procurement—a sign of the persevering with and rising significance of imports to India’s defence preparedness. 

Desk 3. Public Sector’s Contribution to India’s Defence Procurement

  MoD’s Whole Procurement (INR bn) Home Defence Gross sales (INR bn) Home Defence Gross sales as % of MoD’s Procurement Gross sales of Public Sector as % of MoD’s Procurement
Public Sector Personal Sector
2018-19 934.74 637.70 173.50 86.78 68.22
2019-20 1083.40 631.77 158.94 72.98 58.31
2020-21 1393.40 673.75 172.68 60.75 48.35
Whole 3411.54 1943.22 505.12 71.77 56.96

Observe: Procurement consists of each income and capital. Public sector contains DPSUs and different PSUs and government-sponsored Joint Ventures.

Supply: Compiled by writer from Lok Sabha, “Indigenous Manufacturing of Defence Gear” and DDP, “Dashboard”.[41]

From the angle of the general public sector, their declining share in defence procurement shouldn’t be the one concern. Not all of the gross sales of the general public sector are made to the Indian armed forces; an element is to non-defence shoppers and in addition within the type of exports. As an illustration, 22 % of gross sales turnover of the BEL, India’s second largest defence firm, got here from the non-defence phase in 2021-22.[42] Likewise over 15 % of OFB’s complete worth of gross sales was to shoppers apart from the Indian armed forces.[43]

The shortcoming of the general public sector in assembly the necessities of the armed forces has resulted in India being extremely depending on exterior sources. If Britain, adopted by the Soviet Union/Russia, have been the key suppliers of arms in the course of the Chilly Conflict, Israel and the US have emerged as massive suppliers within the post-Chilly Conflict interval.[44] The US, specifically, has been fairly profitable in bagging mega defence offers price US$20 billion between 2008 and 2020.[45]

One other concern is that quite a lot of gross sales of the general public sector (and certainly the bigger defence {industry}) relies on imported inputs for home manufacturing. In accordance with an estimate by the MoD, the overall worth of intermediate items i.e., components, elements, spares and uncooked supplies (alloys and different particular supplies) imported by the DPSUs and OFs and their home suppliers totaled INR 363 billion in 2017-18,[46] representing 62 % of their (DPSUs & OFs) worth of gross sales in that 12 months.

The import dependency of the Indian public sector is probably finest illustrated by HAL, India’s largest defence firm. As reported to the Indian Parliament, HAL has achieved indigenous content material (by worth) of greater than 50 % in all however one platform it presently manufactures (Desk 4). This doesn’t look like a imply achievement on condition that plane manufacturing entails high-end applied sciences and superior supplies. Nevertheless, this wants deeper examination to grasp what the upper indigenous content material (IC) means. HAL, like different defence entities, estimates IC based mostly on the worth of the merchandise, considering the price of supplies, labour, overhead expenses and in addition the revenue. From the self-reliance standpoint, what’s essential is the indigenisation of supplies, by which HAL’s capability is barely minimal. 

Desk 4. Indigenous Content material in HAL-Manufactured Aircrafts and Helicopters

Platform Indigenous Content material by Worth (%)
LCA Tejas Mk1/Mk1A 53.55
Su-30MKI 51.48
Do-228 44.19
Superior Mild Helicopter 55.89
Mild Fight Helicopter 54.09
Mild Utility Helicopter 52.01

Supply: Lok Sabha, “Defence Plane and Helicopters”[47]

As Determine 1 brings out, India’s premier navy plane firm relies to the extent of over 80 % on imported supplies. The Comptroller and Auditor Basic of India (CAG) as soon as castigated the HAL for its poor indigenisation within the indigenously designed Superior Mild Helicopter (ALH), noting: “As towards the envisaged indigenisation stage of fifty %, about 90 % of the worth of fabric utilized in every helicopter is procured from overseas suppliers.”[48]

 Determine 1. Share of Import in HAL’s Materials Consumption

Observe: Materials consists of uncooked supplies, elements and spare components
Supply: Compiled from HAL, Annual Report (related years)

Import dependency varies from one public sector enterprise to a different because it does from platform to platform, relying on the technological complexity. The erstwhile ordnance factories, which largely operated within the decrease finish of the expertise spectrum, have a excessive indigenous content material (IC) of over 90 %.[49] One other phase the place the Indian public sector has achieved a excessive diploma of indigenisation is warship constructing. The home shipyards have achieved 80 % indigenisation within the newest variations of destroyers and frigates.[50] The primary ever plane provider, INS Vikrant constructed by the CSL, incorporates IC of 76 %.[51]

It’s, nevertheless, price noting that top indigenisation, significantly of imported gadgets, has not essentially led to new homegrown merchandise. For instance, the Armoured Autos Nigam Ltd (AVNL), a brand new DPSU that emerged out of amalgamation of 12 erstwhile OFs, claims to have achieved indigenisation of 100% in engines of Russian-origin T-72 and T-90 tanks.[52] This has not led the corporate to design and manufacture an indigenous engine for powering the indigenous Arjun tank—a activity that the DRDO has now taken up.

Certainly, only a few Indian public sector manufacturing entities produce high-value gadgets based mostly on applied sciences developed indigenously. License-based manufacturing, which India has adopted since independence, has been the leitmotif in India’s main arms manufacturing programmes. Between 2016 and 2020, licensed manufacturing represented 58 % of India’s complete arms acquisitions.[53] The OFB, which traces its origin to British rule, as soon as had 90 % of its turnover coming from applied sciences developed exterior the organisation.[54]

Barring just a few gadgets developed by the manufacturing entities themselves, DRDO has been entrusted with the duty of the event of main platforms, aside from all of the strategic methods. Nevertheless, DRDO has not at all times been in a position to ship as per the agreed time, price range, and specs. Submitting earlier than the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (2017-18), the federal government famous delays and value overruns in 28 tasks every costing INR 1 billion. The tasks embody fighter plane (naval model), missiles, plane engine, and plane upgrades.[55] There are additionally cases the place the DRDO has failed in its mission to develop vital applied sciences, resulting in short-closure of tasks after they incurred quite a lot of time and expense.[56]

In a 2021 report, The CAG famous the short-closure of a challenge to develop a Millimeter Wave (MMW) machine—an MTCR (Missile Expertise Management Regime)-controlled merchandise that has utility in seeker and precision-guided munition—after spending greater than a decade and INR 665.1 million. The auditor’s concern was much less the failure, however extra the best way the challenge was dealt with, resulting in its “irregular closure.” The auditor noticed that regardless of the three years initially envisaged for product improvement, the lab took greater than 12 years earlier than short-closing the challenge. It incurred INR 180 million in creating an air-conditioned room simply earlier than the challenge was shut down.[57]

Aside from insufficient indigenisation, the DPSUs exhibit inefficiencies in a number of parameters resembling exports, labour productiveness and innovation. The general public sector, which loved monopoly in home arms manufacturing until 2001, has traditionally been a reluctant participant within the international arms market. Their angle seems to have modified little even after the federal government’s prodding (by means of the setting export targets) and articulation of industry-friendly export promotion measures. The personal sector, with far much less expertise, has had extra success in exports, although a lot of its worldwide gross sales are within the type of components, elements, assemblies and sub-assemblies.[58]

The DPSUs would be the massive gamers, however in relation to productiveness, they fare poorly. In comparison with international corporations, the labour productiveness of the DPSUs is lower than one-fifth.[59] At instances, the low labour productiveness of the general public sector corporations has been a stumbling block in India’s acquisition course of. As an illustration, the French plane manufacture, Dassault Aviation, refused to simply accept HAL’s excessive labour requirement to provide 108 Rafale fighter plane below switch of expertise (ToT) in its manufacturing facility. The French firm had quoted 31.2 million man-hours in its bid doc, towards which HAL insisted on a a lot increased labour content material amounting to 2.7 instances the overall French labour hours. This was one of many elements that lastly led to a stalemate in contract negotiations earlier than the deal’s final cancellation.[i] (The federal government as an alternative determined to signal a separate contract with France for off-the-shelf procurement of 36 Rafales).

Low labour productiveness is commonly linked to poor human useful resource (HR) administration.[60] That is finest illustrated within the case of DRDO, which has had near-monopoly in defence R&D. The company faces an enormous scarcity of the personnel required to execute all of the tasks whose quantity has grown through the years. Towards a sanctioned personnel energy of 34,000 (together with 8,700 scientists), it has 24,000 as of January 2019. As a substitute of managing HR judiciously, DRDO is commonly deputing scientists to carry out duties for which they’re overqualified. As an illustration, the Civil Works and Estates wing of the organisation, liable for building and property administration on behalf of the DRDO, has an authorised energy of 53 officers who’re drawn from the Civil Works Officers Cadre (CWOC). On the bottom, the Wing has 76 officers, together with 38 scientists who have been deputed down with out the federal government’s approval.[61]

The general public sector, particularly the manufacturing entities, have traditionally been torpid on the innovation entrance, reflecting what the previous defence minister, AK Antony, had as soon as termed as a “miserly angle” in the direction of R&D.[62] Apart from HAL and BEL, different manufacturing companies have negligible R&D spending (see Desk 2).

With the DPSUs spending little or no on R&D, the burden of defence analysis has largely been shouldered by the DRDO. Nevertheless, with about 7,000 scientists and a price range of lower than US$3 billion (in comparison with over US$100 billion for the US), there’s a restrict to what the R&D company may ship, even whether it is made to carry out to its full potential. The restricted sources on the disposal of the DRDO leaves little leeway to spend on futuristic applied sciences as it’s largely preoccupied with Mission Mode tasks—that are utilized analysis in nature and contain designing of prototypes—to fulfill the instant requirement of the providers.

The DPSUs’ meagre spending on R&D has manifested in its innovation file. Measured in time period of patents, essentially the most goal standards of measuring innovation, the general public sector has little to indicate. Until March 2012, the OFB and the DPSUs collectively had 23 patents.[63] The variety of IPRs has elevated lately, largely as a result of authorities’s prodding of the Mission Raksha Gyan Shakti. As on Could 2022, 16 DPSUs have a portfolio of 1,391 patents, towards 4,290 IPR fillings. Almost 75 % of the all of the patents are, nevertheless, obtained by two organisations—HAL (633) and BEL (287)—indicating that the innovation has not percolated to the vary and depth of the Indian defence {industry}.[64]

Reform within the Defence Public Sector

Despite the fact that the general public sector has been the mainstay in India’s arms manufacturing, it has traditionally acquired little consideration as to how its efficiency might be improved. It is just not too long ago that the federal government has proven some curiosity in reforming the general public sector and certainly the bigger defence {industry}.

The largest initiative undertaken to reform the general public sector lately pertains to the OFs, which have been earlier functioning as a authorities arsenal on no-profit-no-loss foundation. In October 2021, all of the factories have been transformed into seven DPSUs. The daring step of corporatisation, first instructed in 2005, is meant to enhance “effectivity, autonomy, and innovation.”[j] As company entities, the brand new DPSUs are free to work on profit-motive and be accountable for his or her efficiency.

For the older DPSUs, the federal government has taken two steps:  it declared an intention of privatising the BEML, and the itemizing of a number of DPSUs within the inventory trade. The choice to privatise BEML, taken by the Cupboard in 2019, has not, nevertheless, progressed for unspecified causes. Nonetheless, if taken to the supposed conclusion, it might be the primary time that management of a public sector defence firm would transfer to personal palms. The inventory trade listings, executed for 5 DPSUs (HAL, GRSE, MDSL, BDL and MIDHANI) are supposed to enhance company governance and infuse better accountability.

Together with the structural reforms, the federal government has additionally prodded the DPSUs to enhance their functioning and contribute extra to the bigger defence industrial manufacturing. Provisions have been introduced to allow the general public sector to cut back their import dependency, with the PM giving a discount goal of INR 150 billion by 2025. To this impact, public sector manufacturing entities have been given better leeway to develop indigenous provide chain by means of long-term partnership with different home gamers.

In a radical reform of India’s increased defence administration, the federal government, in December 2019, appointed the primary ever Chief of Protection Employees (CDS) and below him created a brand new division, the Division of Navy Affairs (DMA). Amongst different capabilities, the DMA is tasked with selling defence indigenisation. The DMA has to this point introduced 5 lists of 509 gadgets banned for direct import after a selected timeline. Although the record shouldn’t be public sector-specific, a lot of the massive gadgets can be awarded to government-controlled corporations that are already the nominated companies for these things.

Extra considerably, the creation of the DMA and its defence {industry} constitution are more likely to have a salutary impact in containing (if not ending) the ‘battle royale’ that has traditionally put a barrier of distrust between the customers (armed forces) and the general public sector, to the detriment of home defence industrial development.[65] The distrust has typically manifested in stringent calls for from the customers and a eager choice to import. The CAG, in one in every of its reviews, had famous how the Indian military deprived the indigenously developed MBT Arjun in comparative trials with Russian T-90 tank by demanding eight stringent efficiency parameters from the previous whereas stress-free the identical demand for the Russian one.[66] The supreme auditor additionally famous how the Indian air power ignored a home participant within the procurement of plane tires and tubes in favour of a Polish agency which was chosen on a “decide and select foundation” regardless that the overseas agency’s earlier provides have been discovered faulty.[67]

In comparison with the manufacturing entities, the DRDO has seen little significant reform. Latest reforms undertaken by the R&D company embody reorganising the labs below totally different expertise clusters (to deliver extra synergy) and establishing 5 labs below younger scientists. Essential suggestions such because the creation of a Defence Expertise Fee, instructed by the Rama Rao Committee in 2007, to deliver centered consideration of the upper political management on R&D, have been placed on the backburner.

Competitors from the Personal Sector

The general public sector had a monopoly over India’s arms manufacturing until 2001, when the Vajpayee authorities took the choice to open up the defence {industry} to the Indian personal in addition to overseas corporations. The current authorities has taken the personal sector’s participation to a brand new stage by means of the Make in India initiative and the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan (self-reliant India mission).[k] Consequently, the position of the personal sector is slowly however steadily growing. The share of the personal sector in India’s defence manufacturing, which was negligible on the flip of the century, has jumped to almost 20 % by 2021-22 (see Desk 1).

The personal sector, for its half, has grabbed each alternative that has come its approach through the years. That is clearly evident from its engagement in defence-related work flowing from the MoD’s offset pointers.[68] Of 271 Indian corporations working with overseas defence suppliers to execute the latter’s offset liabilities, an amazing quantity is from the personal sector.

Inherent within the personal sector’s rising curiosity and share in defence manufacturing is its functionality to ship gadgets (e.g., artillery weapons) earlier the unique purview of the general public sector. In some cases, the personal sector has additionally been in a position to bag orders (resembling artillery gun, digital surveillance tools and large navy infrastructure challenge) with direct competitors with overseas corporations.[69] Moreover, the personal sector has begun to interrupt the monopoly of the general public sector in some advanced areas. The monopoly of HAL in plane manufacturing was as an illustration damaged when the MoD in September 2021 signed a contract with the Airbus to allow the TATA consortium to fabricate 40 navy transport plane (of 5–10-ton class) in India.[70] These aircrafts are supposed to substitute Avro aircrafts which have been earlier license manufactured by HAL.

The personal sector’s rising functionality to provide much-needed tools can additional be gleaned from the record of apparatus handed over to the Indian military in August 2022. Out of dozen or so items of apparatus handed over, six have been equipped by the personal sector, together with multi-mode hand grenades, downlink tools, Touchdown Craft, Infantry Protected Mobility Car (IPMV), Fast Response Combating Autos,[71] and Lengthy-range rockets.[72]

To encourage the personal sector, the MoD’s procurement guide has offered it with a level-playing filed and carved out devoted process to allow it to fabricate big-ticket gadgets. Below the Strategic Partnership (SP) mannequin, first launched in a procurement guide in 2020, 4 segments have initially been recognized—fighter plane, helicopters, submarines and armoured combating autos (AFV) / Important Battel Tanks (MBT)—for unique participation of the personal sector.[73] Although not a single challenge has moved to the execution part due to procedural and different complexities, it nonetheless signifies the federal government’s openness to herald personal sector at par with the DPSUs.[74]

The position of the personal sector in defence R&D can also be slowly growing, pushed by the coverage initiatives from the federal government. To encourage R&D throughout the {industry}, by start-ups, and by academia, the MoD has to this point introduced three schemes—Improvements for Defence Excellence (iDEX), Expertise Growth Fund (TDF), and Make class. A few of these schemes have began bearing fruit, albeit on a modest scale. As an illustration, the iDEX scheme, which was introduced in 2018 to “foster innovation and expertise improvement” in defence and aerospace by means of monetary help, has led to the signing of 102 contracts.[75] In a lift to the scheme, a Bengaluru-based Deep Tech start-up, QNu Labs, efficiently developed superior quantum communication expertise for hack-proof communication over a distance greater than 150 km. Importantly, the Indian military, for which the expertise was curated, has begun the method of its deployment by issuing a industrial tender to the corporate, indicating the success of the expertise and prowess of India’s personal innovation ecosystem.[76] Enthused by the iDEX’s success, the federal government has additionally introduced a brand new model, iDEX Prime, with enhanced funding assist of INR 100 million.

A lift for personal sector in R&D got here in type of Union Finances 2022-23, when the finance minister introduced the federal government’s intention to encourage the {industry} “to take up design and improvement of navy platforms and tools in collaboration with DRDO and different organisations by means of SPV [Special Purpose Vehicle] mannequin.” To encourage the {industry}, she additional introduced the liberating up of 25 % of the defence R&D price range for the {industry}, begin up, and academia.[77]

Consequent to the price range announcement, the federal government has recognized 18 gadgets for the industry-led design and improvement below distinction procurement routes.[l] These embody: hypersonic glide autos, gentle weight tanks, multi-role helicopters, low orbit pseudo satellites, and anti-jamming methods.[78] As well as, the funding to the {industry} below the TDF, which was earlier capped at INR 100 million, has been elevated fivefold to INR 500 million.[79]

Recognising the position of the personal sector, the federal government has additionally allotted a separate price range for procurement. In 2022-23, of the INR 845.98 billion earmarked for capital procurement from the home {industry}, INR 211.49 (25 %) is individually allotted to the personal sector.


The general public sector has been the first beneficiary of India’s drive for self-sufficiency in arms manufacturing and analysis. Starting with a modest base on the time of independence, the sector now consists of a sprawling infrastructure catering to each R&D and manufacturing and an unlimited pool of workforce of almost 152,000. Nevertheless, the sector has not carried out to expectation. With lower than 60-percent share in India’s defence procurement, the general public sector is especially liable for India’s persevering with arms import dependency. The general public sector additionally displays a number of inefficiencies, manifested in its poor indigenisation of enter supplies, insufficient innovation, sub-optimal administration of human sources, and meagre export gross sales.

The entry of the personal sector, initially into manufacturing and more and more into R&D, is starting to make a dent on the monopoly standing of the general public sector, although the latter nonetheless stays the dominant participant in India’s arms {industry}. Nevertheless, its dominance is more likely to cut back additional with the rising success of the personal enterprises. In a really quick time, the personal sector has proven its competence in acquiring orders by means of competitors and making fast progress in expertise improvement. With authorities’s coverage more and more offering a stage enjoying subject for personal entities, its footprint is more likely to enhance sooner or later, decreasing the position of the general public sector even additional.

Nevertheless, given the scale, expertise and experience of the general public sector, it’s in India’s curiosity to make sure that it performs a much more significant position than they’re now discharging. The federal government, being its largest stakeholder, must demand strict accountability in regard to high quality, timeline, productiveness and innovation. On the identical time, the federal government should encourage public sector producers to step up their in-house R&D whereas growing its R&D price range. With an R&D price range of lower than US$3 billion, and a pool of about 7,000 scientists (in DRDO), it presently lacks the sources to assist India obtain self-reliance, particularly within the massive navy platforms.



[a] In accordance with SIPRI, India was the biggest arms importer throughout 2018-22, accounting for 11 % of complete international arms import. Pieter D. Wezeman, Justine Gadon and Siemot T. Wezeman, “Tendencies in Worldwide Arms Commerce, 2022,” SIPRI Reality Sheet, March 2023.

[b] The prohibitive value of successive generations of navy tools is finest illustrated by Norman Augustine, who in his 1983 ebook articulated an aphorism that “Within the 12 months 2054, your entire [US]defence price range will buy only one plane. This plane should be shared by the Air Drive and Navy 3 ½ days every per week aside from intercalary year, when will probably be made out there to the Marines for the additional day.” Quoted in “Defence spending in a time of austerity,” The Economist, August 26, 2010.

[c] India’s offset pointers, which have been first printed in 2005 and have been revised a number of instances, mandate overseas corporations to plough again at the very least 30 % of the contract quantity to the Indian {industry}. Laxman Kumar Behera, “Defence Offsets: Worldwide Greatest Practices and Classes for India,” IDSA Monograph, No. 45, June 2015, file:///C:/Customers/Laxman/Downloads/monograph45.pdf.

[d] In a reply to the Indian Parliament, the junior defence minister, Ajay Bhatt knowledgeable that the “Course of for acquiring Cupboard Committee on Safety’s (CCS) approval for design and prototype improvement of Superior Medium Fight Plane (AMCA) has been initiated.” Rajya Sabha, “Authorities Plans on AMCA,” Unstarred Query No. 1329, Answered on March 14, 2022.

[e] Two main defence gadgets gifted by India to neighbouring international locations lately embody a refurbished submarine to Myanmar and a Dornier plane to Sri Lanka. The presents are supposed to counter the affect of China in these international locations. See Rezaul H Laskar, “India presents submarine to Myanmar, beneficial properties edge over China,” The Hindustan Instances, October 21, 2020; “India presents Dornier to Sri Lanka a day forward of Chinese language vessel arrival,” The Hindustan Instances, August 16, 2022.

[f] The seven new DPSUs are: Munitions India Ltd (MIL), Armoured Autos Nigam Ltd (AVNL), Superior Weapons and Gear India Ltd (AWEIL), Troop Comforts Ltd (TCL), Yantra India Ltd (YOL), India Optel Ltd (IOL) and Gliders India Ltd (GIL).

[g] Companies liable for high quality monitoring embody: Directorate Basic of High quality Assurance (DGQA), Directorate Basic of Aeronautical High quality Assurance (DGAQA), Missile System High quality Assurance Company (MSQAA), Directorate Basic of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI), and Strategic System High quality Assurance Group (SSQAG).

[h] HAL and BEL with a world rank of forty first and 61st, respectively are the one two Indian corporations that determine on this planet’s top-100 defence corporations in 2021. Among the many top-20 defence corporations, US tops the record with 08 corporations adopted by China (07), Europe (04) and Russia (01). Protection Information, “High-100 for 2021”.

[i] The opposite crucial issue that contributed to assertion within the contract negotiation was Dassault’s refusal to ensure the standard of aircrafts to be produced by HAL. CAG, “Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Drive,” Report No. 3 of 2019, p. 124.

[j] As company entities, the board of administrators of the DPSUs are empowered to take sure unbiased choices earlier the prerogative of the MoD.

[k] A number of the steps taken to encourage personal participation embody simplification of the commercial licensing course of, opening up of government-owned trial and testing amenities to be used by the personal corporations and articulation of an {industry} pleasant export pointers, amongst others.

[l] Of the 18 gadgets, 14 are deliberate to be executed below Make-I, 2 below SPV mannequin and one every below iDEX and Make-II. See Lok Sabha, “Business Led Design and Growth in Defence Sector,” Unstarred Query No. 4964, Answered on April 01, 2022.

[1] Snehesh Alex Philip, “Armed forces engaged on 100 emergency procurement contracts amid tensions with China,ThePrint, July 21, 2020, (accessed on August 14, 2022).

[2] Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon, “Making arms in India? Analyzing New Delhi’s renewed drive for defence-industrial indigenization,” Defence Research, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2019, p. 355.

[3] The arms commerce with the third world (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), pp. 737-38.

[4] Çağlar Kurç and Richard A. Bitzinger, “Protection Industries within the 21st Century: A Comparative Evaluation–The Second E-Workshop,” Comparative Technique, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2018, p. 255.

[5] Kurç and Bitzinger, “Protection Industries within the 21st Century,” p. 255.

[6] Nan Tian et al., “Tendencies in World Navy Expenditure, 2022,SIPRI Reality Sheet, April 2023. (accessed on October 10, 2023).

[7] Laxman Kumar Behera and G Balachandran, “Implication of CAATSA for India’s Defence Relations with Russia and America,IDSA Concern Transient, April 26, 2018, (accessed on August 16, 2022).

[8] Ashley J. Tellis, “‘What’s in our Curiosity’: India and the Ukraine Conflict,” Carnegie Endowment for Worldwide Peace, April 25, 2022.

[9] Ajay Sura, “India overcharged for satellite tv for pc pictures, arms throughout Kargil,” The Instances of India, December 14, 2019.

[10] Sura, “India overcharged for satellite tv for pc pictures, arms throughout Kargil”.

[11] “Amid Ukraine-Russia struggle, IAF’s Rs 35,000 crore plan to improve Su-30 fighter fleet placed on backburner,” The Instances of India, Could 08, 2022.

[12] Press Data Bureau (PIB), “Ministry of Defence organizes submit price range webinar ‘Aatmanirbharta in Defence – Name to Motion,’” February 25, 2022.

[13] Comptroller and Auditor Basic of India (CAG), “Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Drive,” Report No. 3 of 2019, pp. 130-31.

[14] PIB, “Profitable firing of Brahmos Air Launched Missile from Su-30 MKI Plane,” November 22, 2017.

[15] R.Ok. Tyagi, “Inside story: How Brahmos missile bought built-in with Sukhoi-30 fighter airplane,” ThePrint, November 29, 2017.

[16] S. Nihal Singh, “Why India goes to Moscow for Arms,” Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 7, 1984, pp. 707-20; Amit Gupta, “Techno-nationalism vs. techno globalization: India’s miliary acquisitions and arms manufacturing dilemma,” Comparative Technique, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2022.

[17] Reserve Financial institution of India, “Weekly Statistical Complement”.

[18] Ministry of Finance, Financial Survey 2017-18, Vol. II, p. 125.

[19] PIB, “8 Years Seva, Sushasan, Garib Kalyan”.

[20] Richard A. Bitzinger, “Protection Industries in Asia and the Technonationalist Impulse,” Modern Safety Coverage, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2015, pp. 453-472.

[21] Alex Capri, “Techno-nationalism: What’s it and the way will it change international commerce,Forbes, December 20, 2019.

[22] Richard A. Bitzinger, “Protection Industries in Asia and the Technonationalist Impulse,” pp. 453-472.

[23] Laxman Kumar Behera, “Indian Defence Business: Problems with Self-Reliance,IDSA Monograph, July 2013, p. 32. (accessed on August 15, 2022)

[24] David Kinsella and Jugdep S. Chima, “Symbols of statehood: navy industrialization and public discourse in India,” Evaluation of Worldwide Research, Vol. 27, 2001, pp. 353-373.

[25] Ajay Singh, “Quest for Self-Reliance,” in Jasjit Singh, India’s Defence Spending: Assessing Future Wants (Delhi: Hardev Printers, 2001), pp. 127.

[26]India’s self-reliance in defence sector to spice up international standing,Mint, August 27, 2020.

[27] Sanjaya Baru, 75 years of Indian economic system: re-emerge, reinvest, re-engage (New Delhi: Rupa, 2022), pp. 57-64.

[28] Arvind Panagaria, “The India economic system at 75,” The Spherical Desk, Vol. 111, No. 3, 2022, pp. 275-290.

[29] Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Safety: Defence Insurance policies, 1947-1965 (Berkeley: College of California Press, 1967), pp. 192-207.

[30] Laxman Kumar Behera, “Altering contours of Indian defence expenditure: Previous as Prologue?,” in Harsh Pant (ed.), Handbook of Indian Defence Coverage (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 227-229.

[31] Kavic, India’s Quest for Safety, p. 193.

[32] CARE Ranking Ltd., “BrahMos Aerospace Personal Ltd”, Press Launch, March 07, 2022. (accessed on August 10, 2022).

[33] Dinakar Peri, “Philippines inks deal price $375 million for BrahMos missiles,” The Hindu, January 28, 2022.

[34] Laxman Kumar Behera and S. N. Misra, “India’s Naval Shipbuilding Business: Key Gaps and Coverage Choices,” Defence Research, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2012, pp. 434-451.

[35] Division of Defence Manufacturing (DDP), MoD, “Dashboard”.  (accessed on July 01, 2023)

[36] DRDO, Annual Report 2021, p. 4.

[37] Laxman Kumar Behera, “Excessive on Income, Low on Capital: India’s Defence Finances 2023-24,ORF Concern Transient No. 614, February 2023.

[38] CAG, “Defence Analysis and Growth Organisation,” Report No. 15 of 2021, p. 5.

[39] KG Narayanan (ed.), Endeavours in Self-Reliance: Defence Analysis (1983-2018) (Delhi: DESIDOC, 2022), p. 425.

[40] DRDO, “Empowering India By means of Self-Reliance,” p. ii.

[41] Lok Sabha, “Indigenous Manufacturing of Defence Gear,” Starred Query No. 160, February 11, 2022, and DDP, “Dashboard”.

[42] Bharat Electronics Ltd, Annual Report 2021-22, p. 7.

[43] CAG, “Ordnance Factories and Defence Public Sector Undertakings,” Report No. 25 of 2021, p. 11.

[44] Ok Subrahmanyam, “Arms and Politics,” Strategic Evaluation, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2005, pp. 177-186; Laxman Kumar Behera and G Balachandran, “Implication of CAATSA for India’s Defence Relations with Russia and America”.

[45] U.S. Division of State, “U.S. Safety Cooperation with India,” Reality Sheet, January 20, 2021. (Accessed on August 16, 2022).

[46] DDP, “Coverage for Indigenisation of Elements and Spare utilized in Defence Platforms for DPSUs/OFB,” March 08, 2019.

[47] Lok Sabha, “Defence Plane and Helicopters,” Unstarred Query No. 2270, Answered on July 29, 2022.

[48] CAG, “Efficiency Audit of Actions of Public Sector Undertakings,” Report No. 10 of 2010-11, p. 23.

[49] Standing Committee on Defence, seventeenth Lok Sabha, “Calls for for Grants 2021-22,” twenty second Report, p. 16.

[50] Laxman Kumar Behera, “Analyzing India’s Defence Innovation Efficiency,” Journal of Strategic Research, Vol.  44, No. 6, 2021, p. 832.

[51] PIB, “Supply of Indigenous Plane Provider (IAC) ‘Vikrant,’” July 28, 2022.

[52] Standing Committee on Defence, seventeenth Lok Sabha, “Calls for for Grants 2022-23,” twenty ninth Report, p. 17

[53] Lucie Béraud-Sudreau et al., “Arms-Manufacturing Capabilities within the Indo-Pacific Area: Measing Self-Reliance,” SIPRI, October 2022, p. 16.

[54] “Initiatives of Ordnance Manufacturing unit Board,” Ayudh XXXX, 2014, p. 6.

[55] Standing Committee on Defence, sixteenth Lok Sabha, “Demand for Grants 2018-19,” forty third Report, Annexure ‘E’.

[56] Rajya Sabha, “Tasks Discontinued Closed by DRDO,” Unstarred Query No. 974, Answered on March 05, 2018.

[57] CAG, “Defence Analysis and Growth Group,” Report No. 15 of 2021, pp. 59-61.

[58] Laxman Kumar Behera, “Made in India: an aspiring model in international arms bazaar,” Protection & Safety Evaluation, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2022, pp.336-348.

[59] Laxman Kumar Behera, Indian Defence Business: An Agenda for Making in India (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), pp. 51.

[60] Laxman Kumar Behera, “Analyzing India’s Defence Innovation Efficiency,” p. 840.

[61] CAG, “Defence Analysis and Growth Organisation,” pp. v.

[62] “Defence {industry} ought to velocity up funding in R&D: Antony”, The Financial Instances, January 31, 2013.

[63] Lok Sabha, “Defence Analysis and Manufacturing,” Unstarred Query No. 5056, Answered on Could 07, 2012.

[64] Division of Defence Manufacturing, “Mission Raksha Gyan Shakti”. (accessed on August 13, 2022)

[65] Laxman Kumar Behera, “Indian Defence Business: A Reform Agenda,” in Gurmeet Kanwal and Neha Kohli (ed), Defence Reforms: A Nationwide Crucial (New Delhi: Pentagon, 2018), p. 189. For a broader dialogue on India’s civil-military relations see Anit Mukherjee, The Absent Dialogue: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Navy in India (New York: Oxford College Press, 2020).

[66] CAG, “Union Authorities (Defence Companies): Military, Ordnance Factories and Defence Public Sector Undertakings,” Report No. 35 of 2014, p. 163.

[67] CAG, “Union Authorities (Defence Companies): Air Drive,” Report No. 14 of 2018, pp. 20-28.

[68] Defence Offset Administration Wing, “Checklist of IOPs,” (accessed on August 09, 2022).

[69] Laxman Kumar Behera, India’s Defence Financial system: Planning, Budgeting, Business and Procurement (London: Routledge, 2021), p. 74.

[70] PIB, “MoD indicators contract with Airbus Defence & House, Spain for acquisition of 56 C-295MW transport plane for IAF,” September 24, 2021.

[71] PIB, “Raksha Mantri palms over indigenously-developed tools & methods to Indian Military in New Delhi,” August 16, 2022.

[72] Manu Pubby, “Defence corporations to fly excessive as MoD okays emergency buys sans import,” The Financial Instances, September 11, 2022.

[73] Ministry of Defence, Defence Acquisition Process 2020, pp. 480-81. (accessed on August 14, 2022).

[74] Shishir Gupta, “Defence ministry to permit personal corporations to develop navy helicopters,” The Hindustan Instances, July 17, 2022.

[75] Rajya Sabha, “Restructuring of Defence Forces,” Unstarred Query No. 2452, Answered on August 08, 2022.

[76] PIB, “MoD all set to take a leap in Quantum Communication Expertise to rejoice ‘Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav,’” August 14, 2022.

[77] Ministry of Finance, “Union Finances 2022-23 (price range speech of the finance minister),” p. 15. (accessed 08 August 2022).

[78] Lok Sabha, “Business led Design and Growth in Defence Sector,” Unstarred Query No. 4964, Answered on April 01, 2022.

[79] PIB, “Funding below Expertise Growth Fund scheme of DRDO enhanced to Rs 50 crore per challenge from Rs 10 crore,” June 08, 2022.

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